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Abstract
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This paper examines the determinants of stock markets’ 
vulnerability to the 2007–2008 crisis. Given that the 
United States (US) was the crisis epicenter, the authors 
analyze the factors driving the co-movement between US 
returns and stock returns in 83 countries. The analysis 
distinguishes between the period before and after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. The findings indicate that 
This paper—a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America & the Caribbean Region; and Finance and 
Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in these departments to 
understand the transmission of the 2007-2008 US financial crisis. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the 
Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at tdidier@worldbank.org, ilove@worldbank.org and 
mmartinezperia@worldbank.org. 
the main channel of transmission was financial. There 
is also evidence of a “wake-up call” or “demonstration 
effect” in the first stage of the crisis, because countries 
with vulnerable banking and corporate sectors exhibited 
higher co-movement with the US market. However, 
despite a collapse in trade across countries, the analysis 
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The  2007-2008  crisis  is  one of historical dimensions –  few would dispute it as one of the 
broadest, deepest, and most complex crises since the Great Depression.
1 Its origins were in the 
United States (US) subprime housing finance market, which showed signs of trouble in the first 
half of 2007.  Initially, this seemed to be a crisis of rather limited scope and many thought 
countries would be able to “decouple” from events in the US.
2  But after Lehman Brothers’ 
collapsed in September 2008, the crisis spread rapidly across institutions, markets, and borders. 
There were massive failures of financial institutions and a staggering collapse in asset values in 
developed and developing countries (see Figure 1). Nonetheless, the transmission of the US 
crisis was heterogeneous across markets around the globe with some countries showing higher 
comovement with the US than others (see Figure 2).
3
This paper empirically investigates the factors that determine stock markets’ vulnerability 
to the 2007-2008 crisis across 83 countries. We focus on stock markets’ reactions during the 
crisis because financial markets were the first to feel the effects of the crisis. Also, analyzing the 
behavior of stock markets is important because equity holdings have become a significant source 
of wealth for individuals around the world and, hence, a decline in asset values could affect 
consumption and other real variables. Finally, monthly stock market data over the crisis period is 
readily available for a significant number of countries, whereas at best annual data could be used 
for other variables like GDP or employment. 
 
To study the transmission channels behind the current crisis, we explore the factors that 
drove the comovement between local and US stock market returns.
  4
                                                           
1 The April 2009 Global Stability Report produced by the IMF estimates that write-downs in developed markets 
could reach US$4 trillion and those in emerging markets could amount to US$ 800 billion or 7 percent of banking 
assets. See http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf. 
  As argued by Claessens, 
Dornbusch, and Park (2001), an analysis based on correlations of stock returns sheds light on the 
cross-country transmission of shocks  as they reflect cross-market linkages.  In particular, we 
2 The subprime market represented 15 percent of US total residential mortgages in 2006 and the latter accounted for 
25 percent of US total debt (see Agarwal and Ho, 2007). 
3 For each country, comovement with the US is measured by the coefficient of a regression of monthly local stock 
returns (i.e., the percentage change in the stock market index)  on US stock returns during the period July 2007 – 
April 2009. 
4 See Didier, Mauro, and Schmukler (2008) for a discussion of the different channels through which crises can be 
transmitted. 3 
 
evaluate the extent to which the comovement in stock market returns was driven by real linkages 
between economies, financial linkages across markets, or was the consequence of a “wake-up 
call”  (see Goldstein, 1998)   or “demonstration effect” (see Masson, 1998) where investors 
became aware that certain vulnerabilities present in the US context could put other economies at 
risk.  
Real linkages refer to trade effects of which there are two main kinds: competitiveness 
effect - when changes in relative prices affect a country’s ability to compete abroad – and income 
effect - when the crisis reduces income and consequently import demand. Financial linkages 
across markets operate  primarily  through the financial (or capital flows) account among 
countries that are connected to the international financial system. Such linkages can be direct or 
indirect. Direct financial linkages arise due to  direct  financial  exposures between the crisis 
country and other countries. For example, when foreign investors own assets from the crisis 
country or vice versa. Indirect financial linkages involve the actions of international investors 
(“common creditors”), who transmit crises across the various countries where they hold assets 
either because of margin calls, changes in risk aversion,  or herding (due to asymmetric 
information). Finally, comovement across markets might not be related to any sort of linkages 
across markets, but might happen as a result of a new interpretation of existing information, 
which stimulates learning and awareness. In particular, after investors see a certain economy 
collapse (e.g., U.S.), they might start to question the safety of investments in countries with 
similar economic vulnerabilities.  
Using stock market data for the US and 83 other countries between July 2007 and April 
2009, we evaluate the significance of the transmission channels discussed. In order to determine 
how important these different factors are in explaining cross-country linkages during the 2007-
2008 financial crisis, we follow a one-step approach in which each markets’ correlation vis-a-vis 
the US market is  interacted with country-level characteristics  representing the channels 
mentioned above. This methodology allows us to identify  and compare the extent to which 
different channels have an impact on the sensitivity of domestic stock market returns to US 
market returns.  4 
 
To capture potential trade linkages, we examine the effect of variables such as exports to 
the US relative to GDP, total exports to GDP, trade openness (defined as exports plus imports to 
GDP) and export composition measures (such as the share of fuel and, separately, agricultural 
exports to total exports). Our estimations also examine the role of financial linkages. We include 
measures of bilateral financial linkages such as foreign holding of US equity and US holding of 
foreign equity,  as well as broader measures of  financial integration such as  capital account 
openness, capital inflows to GDP, stock market size and liquidity. Finally, to account for the 
possibility of a wake-up call or a demonstration effect from the US crisis that raises investors’ 
awareness of potential risks in other markets, we control for measures of banking, corporate, 
macro, and sectoral vulnerabilities. 
Our estimations reveal some interesting patterns regarding the transmission of the crisis. 
First, the main channel of transmission appears to have been financial. We find evidence of 
financial linkages at work both in the periods before and after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
In particular, markets with high ratios of equity holdings by US investors exhibited  greater 
comovement. Also, countries with high levels of portfolio inflows, more liquid and more 
developed stock markets were more correlated with the US market. Second, to the extent that 
there was a wake-up call or a demonstration effect from the US crisis that led to comovement 
across financial markets, it primarily manifested itself during the first stage of the crisis, before 
the collapse of Lehman. During this early period, we find that in countries with more vulnerable 
banking and corporate sectors, stock markets were more significantly correlated with the US 
market. This was not the case during the period after the collapse of Lehman. Third, despite the 
large contraction in trade flows during the crisis period, we find no support for a real/trade 
channel of transmission. 
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature.  First, we contribute to the still 
relatively small but growing literature on the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Most of the existing 
papers have focused on the causes and consequences of the crisis and thus, have mostly analyzed 
its epicenter, the US.
5
                                                           
5  See Caprio, Demirguc-Kunt, and Kane (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), Brunnermeier (2009), Calomiris 
(2009), Cecchetti (2009), and Taylor (2009), among many others. 
  However, a few have studied the global transmission of this  crisis. 
Fratzscher (2009) and Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2009) focus on the transmission via 5 
 
exchange rates. They report mixed results regarding the effects on exchange rates of worse than 
average current accounts, of high financial exposure to the US, of large short-term debt levels, 
and  of  relatively low international reserves. Alternatively, Dooley and Hutchison (2009) 
provides evidence that news events from the U.S. have had a large impact on credit default swap 
spreads in emerging markets,  especially in the period after the fall of Lehman Brothers, 
effectively transmitting the US financial crisis to markets abroad. Rose and Spiegel (2009a and 
2009b) conduct an analysis of the international propagation of the crisis based on a measure of 
crisis incidence and severity  which  combines four indicators: changes in real GDP, stock 
markets, credit ratings, and exchange rates.  These studies  do not find  strong  evidence that 
bilateral linkages with the US or domestic fundamentals have been associated with the incidence 
or severity of the crisis across countries. Lastly and more closely related to our paper, Ehrmann, 
Fratzscher, and Mehl (2009) studies the crisis transmission through movements in stock markets. 
This paper focuses on about 450 industry-equity portfolios across 64 countries and finds that 
macro country risk dwarfed micro, firm-level risk as a global transmission channel. Also, the 
study finds that equity portfolios with a high degree of integration with the US market before the 
crisis were more strongly affected than more segregated ones. Although our work is related to 
these papers, we focus on the factors explaining comovement with the US, as opposed to the 
incidence of the crisis across countries. 
Second, we also expand the vast literature analyzing how shocks propagate across 
countries around turbulent times more broadly. This literature is deeply intertwined with works 
on the existence of contagion as there is no consensus on how to clearly distinguish it from other 
crises transmission channels.
6 A large number of papers analyze the transmission of crises by 
focusing directly on a particular transmission mechanism such as the role of trade linkages.
7 
Alternatively, other papers provide evidence of the relative importance of the different 
transmission channels.
8
                                                           
6 See for example Claessens and Forbes (2001) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002). 
  Lastly, many others do not examine propagation mechanisms 
themselves, but rather focus on whether cross-market linkages, measured mostly through stock 
7 See Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2001), Forbes (2002), Kim and Wei (2002), Broner, Gelos, and Reinhart 
(2006), among many others. 
8 See Glick and Rose (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), among many 
others. 6 
 
market correlations, have increased during turbulent times.
9 However, despite the vast literature 
on the propagation of shocks across countries, there are relatively few papers evaluating the 
demonstration effects or the wake-up call hypothesis.
10
Lastly, we contribute to a third strand of the literature that analyzes the drivers of stock 
market correlations in order to understand the determinants of international linkages across 
countries over time.
 Our paper contributes to this literature by 
analyzing the significance of different channels of crises propagation including real and financial 
linkages and the demonstration effect or wake-up call hypothesis. In particular, we study the 
determinants of stock market comovements around the 2007-2008 financial crisis, although we 
do not focus on whether comovement has been excessive or irrational. 
11
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical 
methodology. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 analyzes the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 For instance, Quinn and Voth (2008) study the effects of capital account 
openness and the synchronization of fundamentals on stock market correlations over long-run 
periods. Similarly, Forbes and Chinn (2004) analyze whether the direct trade flows, competition 
in third markets, bilateral bank lending, and foreign direct investment affect cross-country 
linkages in stock and bond markets also over long periods of time. We follow a methodology 
similar to these papers, but focus on factors affecting stock market comovement  during  the 
recent crisis. 
2.  Empirical methodology 
To examine stock markets’ vulnerability to the 2007-2008 crisis, we estimate a model where 
monthly local stock market returns (expressed in US dollars) are a function of returns in the US 
market, the epicenter of the crisis. We explore the determinants of local markets’ comovement 
with the US by interacting US returns with different country-level variables.  We also include 
                                                           
9 See King and Wadhwani (1990), Calvo and Reinhart (1996), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng 
(2005), Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2005), among many others. 
10 For a theoretical framework, see Shiller (1995), and for empirical studies, see Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz 
(1998), Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), Baig and Godfajn (1999), Forbes (1999), and Van Rijckeghem and 
Weder (2003). 
11 See for example Hamao, Masulis, and Ng (1990), Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1994), Longin and Solnik (1995), 
Ang and Bekaert (2002), Dumas, Harvey, and Ruiz (2003), Goetzmann, Li, and Rouwenhorst (2005), and Kizys and 
Pierdzioch (2009). 7 
 
monthly  time effects  that capture global factors (e.g., changes in commodity prices, an 
international drop in liquidity, etc.), and country-specific fixed effects that capture the individual 
country average returns over the time period we consider. We distinguish between two periods: 
before and after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008  since that event is 
considered by many to be a turning point in the crisis (see for example Dooley and Hutchison, 
2009, Raddatz, 2009). The empirical model can be summarized by equation (1) below: 
, , , , , t c t c c t US post post c t US pre pre t c X r D X r D r ε µ α β β + + + + =  (1) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 is the stock market return in country c at time t measured in US dollars and 𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑡𝑡   is the 
return on the US stock market index at time t. 𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝  refers to a dummy that equals one for the 
period before the collapse of Lehman  Brothers  (July 2007 through August 2008) and 𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡   
refers to a dummy that equals one for the period after Lehman’s demise (September of 2008 until 
April 2009). 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐 is a matrix of pre-crisis country characteristics that could affect the degree of 
comovement between the US market and the local country c market. In particular, 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐 includes 
variables  that  capture  real  (trade)  and financial  linkages between the US market and other 
markets, as well as variables that capture the possibility that crisis transmission arose from a 
wake-up call or demonstration effect. Country-level factors included in 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐 are measured at the 
end of 2006, minimizing concerns about endogeneity. 𝗽𝗽𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝  and 𝗽𝗽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  indicate the extent to which 
different factors explain the comovement between the local and US markets. µ𝑡𝑡 and 𝗼𝗼𝑐𝑐 are time 
and country effects, respectively. Because returns may be correlated over time within country, 
we estimate the model allowing for clustered standard errors at the country-level. 
To compare the impact of country characteristics that can affect comovement in  the 
period before and after the collapse of Lehman, we perform an F-test for the equivalence of 
coefficients  𝗽𝗽𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝   and  𝗽𝗽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡. To  make the comparison of economic significance of different 
variables and transmission channels easier, we standardized all of the independent variables prior 
to interacting them with US returns (i.e., we transform regressors by substracting their mean and 
dividing them by their standard deviation). Hence, the coefficients on the regressors can be 
interpreted as representing the change in comovement due to a one standard deviation change in 
a regressor. Because the number of countries drops considerably when we combine different 
country characteristics, we start by reporting estimations with only one regressor at a time (aside 8 
 
from the country and time dummies). However, to test the robustness of our results, we also 
report estimations combining the most significant variables. 
Our one-step model described above is equivalent to a two-step procedure in which the 
local returns for each country are regressed on US returns in the first step, and in the second step, 
the  estimated  coefficients on  US returns from the first step, which measure each market’s 
comovement with the US, are regressed on the country-level characteristics that proxy for the 
different transmission channels. The two-step methodology is useful for graphical representation 
of our results and we show graphs of the comovement against some country characteristics to 
visually illustrate whether a given factor appears to be explaining the extent of transmission. For 
inference, however, we use the one-step methodology as it produces more efficient estimates.  
3.  Data 
Local and US returns data for the period July 2007 through April 2009 are calculated from stock 
market prices obtained from Bloomberg. All country-level variables used  to explore the 
determinants of the degree of comovement between the US and other markets are measured at 
the end of 2006 or earlier. Table 1 presents a list of these variables along with their definition 
and data sources. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for each variable. To deal with outliers, we 
remove  observations  that are three  standard deviations below and above the mean  of each 
variable.  
To measure bilateral trade linkages, we compute the share of exports to the US relative to 
GDP from data obtained from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. We also collect data on 
broader trade indicators such as exports to GDP, trade openness (defined as the ratio of exports 
plus imports to GDP), fuel exports to total exports, and agricultural exports to total exports. This 
data come from the IMF International Financial Statistics  and the World Bank World 
Development Indicators. 
To measure financial linkages between the US and other countries we include a number 
of indicators, collected from multiple sources. First, we construct the ratio of US holdings of 
foreign equity to local market capitalization and the ratio of foreign holdings of US equity to 
local market capitalization from data from the Treasury International Capital System database 9 
 
compiled by the US Treasury. Second, we include a number of broader measures of capital 
account openness.  In particular, we include the Chinn and Ito Index of Financial Openness 
(Chinn and Ito, 2008) which measures de jure openness to capital flows.
12 We also include 
measures of inflows, namely, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, portfolio (equity and debt) 
inflows and other inflows (mostly bank lending flows). All these variables are scaled by GDP. 
These data come from the IMF Balance of Payment Statistics. Third, we include measures of 
stock market size and liquidity. As a measure of stock market size, we include the ratio of stock 
market capitalization to GDP. Liquidity is measured by the stock market turnover ratio, defined 
as the value of total shares traded to the stock market capitalization. Data on these variables 
come from the World Bank Financial Structure Database.
13
To establish the importance of a wake-up call channel at work in explaining the degree of 
comovement  between the US market and other markets, we compute different measures of 
banking, corporate, macro, and sectoral vulnerabilities. When it comes to banking, we examine 
the significance of variables such as the capital-adequacy ratio (measured by the share of equity 
to assets), the share of liquid assets to total assets, and the ratio of credit to the private sector to 
GDP.  The first two variables are computed with data from Bankscope and the last one comes 
from the World Bank Financial Structure Database. Finally, we also examine the significance of 
an index of banking activities restrictions, which incorporates information as to whether banks 
are allowed to underwrite securities and insurance products, commercialize real estate or own 
non-financial firms. The index, which comes from the Bank Regulation and Supervision 




A number of variables are included to capture corporate sector vulnerability. First, we 
compute the ratio of total debt, and separately, short-term debt to total assets. Second, we also 
examine the significance of return on assets, a measure of firm profitability. Third, we look at a 
 
                                                           
12 The data itself can be found at http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/. 
13 This database can be found at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20696167~pagePK:
64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html. 
14 This data can be found at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345037~pagePK:
64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html. An explanation of how the index was constructed can be 
found at Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001). 10 
 
measure of liquidity defined as the ratio of cash to assets. Data to compute all these ratios come 
from Worldscope. Country-level averages, weighted by firm size, are used in our estimations. 
Finally, using data on interest coverage (the ratio of interest expenses to earnings) from 
Worldscope, we calculate the percentage of firms with interest coverage below 1. This variable 
captures the share of firms that are not able to meet their debt obligations with their earnings. 
Among the proxies for  macroeconomic vulnerability,  we include a measure of fiscal 
imbalance and a number of measures of external imbalances. The fiscal account (budget surplus 
or deficit) to GDP is computed with data from the World Bank Development Indicators. As 
measures of external imbalances, we consider the current account balance to GDP, the financial 
account balance to GDP, and the share of reserves to GDP. All these variables come from the 
IMF Balance of Payment Statistics.  
Finally, because the US crisis started in the real estate sector, we also consider variables 
related to this sector. In particular, we include the share of mortgage debt to GDP as of 2006, the 
cumulative growth rate in this share between 2003 and 2006, the average growth rate in the share 
of mortgage debt to GDP during this period, and the change in real estate prices between 2003 
and 2006. These data come from multiple sources including Bank for International Settlements, 
EMF Hypostat, International Finance Corporation, Market Watch and World Bank. 
4.  Empirical results 
Following the methodology outlined in Section 3, we conduct different estimations to test for 
whether trade linkages, financial linkages or a wake-up call/demonstration effect can explain the 
transmission of the US crisis to other stock markets around the world. 
Trade linkages 
Table  3 shows the estimations testing for whether trade linkages explain the  comovement 
between the US and other countries’ stock markets. Surprisingly, we find that exports to the US 
and total exports to GDP have the reverse sign from the expected– countries with larger share of 
exports show less comovement with the US stock market. However, these results appear to be 
driven by changes in the exchange rate of the US dollar vis-à-vis other currencies in the midst of 11 
 
the crisis. If we estimate the same regressions using local returns the coefficient are negative but 
no longer significant. These results are available upon request.
15
Financial linkages 
  At the same time, we find that 
overall trade openness is not an important predictor of the country’s response to the crisis, as the 
coefficients on this variable are not significant in either period. This is also somewhat surprising, 
since trade flows significantly contracted during the crisis period and may reflect the fact that the 
impact of trade may be observed only on real-side variables. Finally, trade composition does not 
seem to matter either since neither the ratio of fuel exports to total exports nor the share of 
agricultural exports to total exports matter. 
Table 4 reports results on the importance  of financial linkages in explaining stock market 
comovement with the US.  Most interestingly, we find that a  larger  share of US investors’ 
holdings of foreign markets is associated with a more pronounced reaction to the US crisis. This 
is consistent with a  “margin calls”  story where US investors facing  large losses at home 
withdrew money from their foreign investments, and the countries with the larger share of US 
investments were the most affected by such withdrawals. The effect of foreign  investors’ 
holdings of US securities is not significant, but, if anything, it has the opposite impact – as the 
foreign investors could have withdrawn money from their US investments and they could have 
brought that cash home, thus boosting the local market performance.  
Even if a country is not directly exposed to the US stock market (i.e., individuals and 
corporations do not hold US stocks), its market might commove with the US stock market if the 
economy is very open to financial flows and the stock market is very liquid. This is due to the 
fact that for investors who are exposed to the US and have to redeem other investments to make 
up for their US losses it makes sense to exit open and liquid markets. In terms of capital account 
openness, we find that more open countries have experienced higher comovement with the US in 
the period after the collapse of Lehman. The coefficient on the Chinn and Ito de jure measure for 
the post-Lehman period is significant at 10%, and it is statistically different from the first period 
coefficient, also at 10% (according to the F-test). Countries with large portfolio inflows also 
                                                           
15 Also, removing countries with large share of trade to the US, such as Singapore, Malaysia or China make the 
coefficient insignificant even when expressed in US dollars. 12 
 
exhibit a larger degree of comovement with the US market. The results are significant at 1% and 
are almost twice as large in magnitude for the first period. The difference between first and 
second period is statistically significant at 5%.  Figure 3  demonstrates that the relationship 
between the degree of comovement and the share of portfolio inflows to GDP is strong and not 
driven by the outliers. This result contrasts with what we find for the share of foreign direct 
investment inflows to GDP. This variable does not seem to significantly influence stock market 
comovement between the US and other countries. Finally, other inflows (which mostly include 
bank flows) slightly exacerbated the country’s response to the  crisis in the second period 
(significant at 10%).  
Regarding the significance of stock market indicators, we find that more liquid markets 
reacted more to the US crisis. We find that market liquidity is a strong factor in predicting 
comovement with the US in both periods (significant at 1%), and the effect is stronger in the first 
period (the difference in coefficients is statistically significant according to the F-test). Figure 4 
shows that the effect of liquidity on the degree of comovement is not driven by outliers. The 
impact of stock market size, measured by the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP, is 
weaker than the impact of liquidity, and likely to just capture the fact that the shock was more 
prominent in more developed countries, which also happen to have larger stock markets. Indeed, 
when we put two of these factors together, only stock market turnover retains its significance 
(results not reported).  
Wake-up call or demonstration effect 
Comovement across markets might not be related to any sort of linkages between markets but 
might happen as a result of a  new interpretation of existing information which stimulates 
learning and awareness. In other words, the crisis in one country may alert investors to potential 
dangers in other countries with similar types of vulnerabilities. For example, in the context of the 
recent US crisis,  seeing that high levels of credit (in particular mortgage lending)  and 
indebtedness in the US banking and corporate sectors were at the root of the crisis, investors 
might have reassessed the value of their portfolios in countries with similar fundamentals. We 
explore the significance of the wake-up call or demonstration effect hypothesis by examining the 13 
 
role of variables capturing banking, corporate,  macro, and sectoral  vulnerabilities  that were 
frequently mentioned as factors contributing to the US debacle. 
Banking sector vulnerabilities 
Because the 2007-2008 crisis originated in the US banking sector, it is natural to expect that the 
health of the local banking sector may be related to the extent of country’s comovement with the 
US. Table 5 presents our results for some key banking variables. An important aspect of banking 
sector health is the capital adequacy ratio since the ability of banks to withstand losses is directly 
tied to this variable. Our measure of capital adequacy, the equity to assets ratio, shows that 
countries in which banks were better capitalized have experienced less comovement with the US. 
However, this result is not very strong - the coefficient is only significant at the 10 percent 
significance level in the first period and not significant in the second period. The F- test does not 
reject the hypothesis that both coefficients are the same. Nevertheless, Figure 5 reveals that one 
country might be an outlier – Brazil, which has the highest equity to assets ratio of over 25, while 
also suffering a significant response to the crisis. Once Brazil is excluded from the regression, 
the first period coefficient becomes -0.24 with a t-statistics of -3.07 and it is now significantly 
different from the second period coefficient. Thus, we find that better capital adequacy reduces 
countries’ comovement with the US market. 
Bank liquidity is another important banking  characteristic that could reduce the 
magnitude of comovement. Indeed, we find that bank liquidity is related to the extent of 
comovement across stock market returns, but only in the first period. The F-test rejects the 
hypothesis that the coefficients are the same between the two periods. It is possible that by the 
time the more severe period of the crisis started in September 2008, our liquidity variable, which 
is measured at the end of 2006, was outdated. This could be because banks that were more liquid 
at the end of 2006 used up some of this liquidity in the first half of the crisis. Alternatively, in the 
worst period of the crisis, bank liquidity might not be an important factor anymore as the crisis 
seemed to have affected the liquid and less liquid banks in similar ways.   
The US crisis has been associated with the excessive and poorly regulated use of some 
sophisticated financial technologies and instruments such as mortgage-backed securities, 
collateralized debt obligations, collateralized loan obligations, etc (see Caprio, Demirguc-Kunt 14 
 
and Kane, 2008; Goodhart, 2008; Whalen, 2008).  Countries with higher level of financial 
development are likely to have more prevalent availability and use of these instruments. Hence 
we explore whether financial development explains the degree of comovement with the US 
market.  For lack of a better proxy, and  following an extensive literature on  the  subject of 
financial development (see Levine, 2005 for a review), we measure the latter as the share of 
private credit to GDP. We find that countries with a higher proportion of private credit to GDP 
experienced greater comovement in both periods, especially in the first. The F-tests rejects the 
hypothesis of equal coefficients at the 6 percent significance level. The first period coefficient is 
almost twice the size of the second period coefficient.  
The fact that banks could engage in multiple types of activities has also been discussed as 
a factor contributing to the US crisis (See for example Kotlikoff, 2010). We explore whether 
countries with greater restrictions on bank activities suffered less comovement by including an 
index of restrictions on banking activities developed by Barth et al. (2001). This variable is the 
sum of sub-indexes capturing the extent to which banks can engage in real estate, investment 
banking, insurance, and non-financial activities. We find that stock markets in countries with 
more restrictions on bank activities have been less prone to commove with the US market than 
those with fewer restrictions. The impact of the index on banking activities is similar in both 
crisis periods, and the difference between the coefficients is not significant.  
Corporate sector vulnerabilities 
Because our measure of crisis is based on stock price performance, it is natural to expect that 
countries with firms that had weaker fundamentals prior to the crisis might have been more 
vulnerable to the crisis. Table 6 shows our regressions with several measures of corporate sector 
vulnerability described earlier. The interaction between US returns and the corporate debt to 
assets ratio is positive and significant, indicating that countries with more indebted corporates at 
the end of 2006 were more likely to commove with the US. This result supports the recent calls 
for reducing corporate leverage. Another useful indicator is the proportion of firms in the country 
with interest coverage ratio below one, which indicates the share of firms that have difficulty in 
meeting their interest payments with their cash flows (and thus are at a higher risk of defaulting 
on their debt obligations). We find that the larger the share of firms with interest coverage ratios 15 
 
below one, the higher the comovement of local stock market with the US market. Both measures 
are only significant in the first period and have significant F-tests. Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate 
that these effects are not driven by the outliers. Finally, we tried other measures of corporate 
health, such as the proportion of short-term debt to assets, the return on assets, and the stock of 
cash (a proxy for liquidity at the firm level), but we have not found them to be significantly 
related to comovement with the US market.   
Macroeconomic and sectoral vulnerabilities 
We consider several macroeconomic fundamentals that might affect a country’s vulnerability to 
the current crisis. In particular, we examine the role of the current account balance, the financial 
account balance, the ratio of total international reserves to GDP, and the budget deficit. Because 
the crisis was linked to the real estate sector, we also consider the role of several indicators of 
real estate financing and real estate price appreciation. The results are presented in Tables 7 and 
8. We do not find any significant impact of aggregate macro fundamentals on the comovement of 
stock market returns with the US (see Table 7). Our results on macro factors are similar to those 
obtained in Rose and Spiegel (2009a), who also do not find any significant impact of the macro 
factors on the severity of the crisis using a different methodology. On the other hand, Ehrmann et 
al.  (2009) finds that similar macro factors were important in explaining the extent of stock 
market declines during the crisis. However their methodology looks at overall returns, 
controlling for comovement with the US (or US betas), while we look at the factors that make 
comovement with the US stronger during the crisis (i.e. interactions with US betas).  
Surprisingly, we do not find any significance for the real estate indicators either (see 
Table 8). While we find positive coefficients on the extent of real estate price appreciation and 
the size of the mortgage market, they are not statistically significant. One reason might be the 
limited  data availability,  as we have a  significantly smaller number of countries for these 
variables than we have for others.  
Assessing the relative importance of different transmission channels 
As mentioned in Section 3, to compare the economic significance of different variables and 
transmission channels, we standardized all of the independent variables prior to interacting them 16 
 
with US returns. As a result, the interaction coefficient indicates by how much a one standard 
deviation change in a given variable affects the comovement of local stock market return with 
the US return. For example, using results discussed in Table 5, a one standard deviation change 
in the private credit to GDP ratio, increases comovement of the local index with the US market 
by 0.23. To put this in perspective, we first evaluate the average comovement of local returns 
and US returns in our sample for both periods. To do so, we regress local returns on US returns, 
with country dummies, but without time dummies, in a pooled regression with all countries. We 
find that the average comovement is 0.64 in the first period (with t-statistic of about 9) and 0.93 
in the second period (with t-statistic of about 16).
16
Comparing all the variables considered, we find that the strongest effects are observed for 
the measure of stock market liquidity (the turnover ratio), the ratio of US holding of foreign 
equity, the share of portfolio inflows to GDP, the ratio of private credit to GDP, and the share of 
firms with interest coverage ratios below 1. All these variables tend to have a much larger impact 
in the first period. Finally, we pick the strongest factors from each group of variables and run 
several multivariate regressions. The results are presented in Table 9. Except for the last column, 
the remaining regressions exclude  the interest coverage variable  since we have significantly 
fewer observations for that variable. In general, we find that portfolio inflows, stock market 
turnover and US holdings of foreign equity remain significant (in at least one of the periods and 
regressions), while private credit to GDP loses its significance and actually becomes negative.  
 This change is in line with the observation 
that during crisis periods stock market correlations across countries increase. Thus, an impact of 
one standard deviation of private credit in the first period results in an increase of comovement 
by about a third of the average value of comovement in the first period, which is quite a large 
impact.  
Once we include the interest coverage ratio we lose a significant portion of the sample – 
we only have 48 countries now. We find that in the first period of the crisis the interest coverage 
ratio dominates all other variables – it is the only statistically significant factor in the first period. 
This suggests that corporate health is a factor investors care about, especially in the early stages 
of the crisis when they can discriminate between companies with stronger or weaker 
                                                           
16 For comparison, in 2 years prior to crisis the average comovement with the US was about 0.4, with the t-statistic 
of about 5.  17 
 
fundamentals. In the second period,  the strongest significance is obtained for stock market 
turnover, which suggests that in the worst period of the crisis investors withdrew from liquid 
markets. Another important factor is the presence of US investors (the share of US holdings of 
foreign equity), which remains significant at 10% level. While portfolio inflows loses 
significance at conventional levels, its t-statistic of 1.5 in the first period suggests that it still 
could be a factor influencing a country’s response to crisis. Interestingly, with the addition of 
interest coverage, we now find that private credit to GDP is significantly negative in the second 
period, suggesting that financial development might have a mitigating effect, once the other 
contributing factors are taken into account (such as market liquidity, capital flows and the health 
of the corporate sector). However, given our relatively small sample and multicollinearity among 
the variables included in the regression, these results should be treated with caution.  
5.  Conclusions 
This paper examined the determinants of stock markets’ vulnerability to the 2007-2008 crisis by 
analyzing the factors driving the correlation between stock market returns in the US and in 83 
other countries. Not surprisingly, given the nature of the crisis and the fact that we are focusing 
on financial markets, we found that the main channel of transmission was financial. We also 
found evidence of a wake-up in the first stage of the crisis, when countries with vulnerable 
banking and corporate sectors exhibited a higher commovement with the US market. On the 
other hand, despite a collapse in trade across countries, we did not find support for this channel 
of transmission. 
An obvious implication from our findings is the need for countries to contain banking and 
corporate vulnerabilities to limit the transmission of crises. While macro vulnerabilities did not 
seem to matter for transmission in the context of the 2007-2008 crisis, this does not mean that 
they will not play an important role in future crises (as they have in the past). The results also 
highlight the dark side of financial integration and liquidity  since countries that are more 
integrated and have more liquid  markets  experienced greater comovement with the US. 
However, a priori, we believe that countries should not overreact and turn their backs to financial 
integration and  the pursuit of local capital market development. Rather, through adequate 18 
 
regulation and supervision, countries should try to manage the potential exposures that arise from 
having financially integrated and liquid markets. 19 
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Table 1: Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Name  Definition  Source 
US Stock Market Returns  
(%) 
Monthly US stock returns between July 2007 and April 
2009. 
Bloomberg 
Local Stock Market Returns in US$ 
(%) 
Monthly local stock returns expressed in US dollars 
between July 2007 and April 2009. 
Bloomberg 
Trade Channel 
Exports to US/GDP (%)  Export FOB (2006) divided by current GDP(2006)   Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF) 
Exports/GDP (%)  Total exports (2006) to current GDP (2006)   World Development Indicator 
(Export+Import)/GDP (%)  Export FOB &Import CIF (2006) to current GDP (2006)  International Financial Statistics and World 
Development Indicator 
Fuel Exports / Exports (%)  Fuel exports (2006) to total merchandise exports (2006)  World Development Indicator 
Agricultural Exports / Exports (%)  Agricultural raw materials exports (2006) to total 
merchandise exports (2006) 
World Development Indicator 
Financial Channel 
US Holdings of Foreign Equity 
/Local Market Capitalization (%) 
US investments in foreign equity(Jun. 2007) divided by 
local market capitalization (Dec. 2006) 
Treasury International Capital System (US Treasury 
Department) and World Development Indicator 
Foreign Holdings of US Equity 
/Local Market Capitalization (%) 
Foreign investments in US equity(Jun.2007) divided by 
local market capitalization (Dec. 2006) 
Treasury International Capital System (US Treasury 
Department) and World Development Indicator 
Chin-Ito Index of Financial 
Openness 
A measure of the degree of financial openness of a 
country where higher value indicates greater de jure 
financial openness. (2006) 
Chin & Ito (September 2008) 
FDI Inflows/GDP (%)  Foreign direct investment inflows divided by current 
GDP (2006) 
Balance of Payments & International Investment 
Position Statistics (IMF) and World Development 
Indicator 
Portfolio Inflows/GDP (%)  Portfolio investment assets inflows divided by current 
GDP (2006) 
Balance of Payments & International Investment 
Position Statistics (IMF) and World Development 
Indicator 
Other Inflows/GDP (%)  Other assets inflows divided by current GDP (2006)  Balance of Payments & International Investment 
Position Statistics (IMF) and World Development 
Indicator 
Stock Market Turnover (%)  Ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real 
market capitalization (2006)  
Financial Structure Database (World Bank) 
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP 
(%) 
Ratio of the value of listed shares to GDP (2006)  Financial Structure Database (World Bank) 
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Banking Sector Vulnerabilities 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (%)  Total equity divided by total assets (2006)  BankScope 
Liquidity Ratio (%)  Cash and due from banks divided by total assets (2006)  BankScope 
Private Credit to GDP Ratio (%)  Credit extended by deposit money banks and other 
institutions to the private sector measured as a fraction 
of GDP (2006) 
Financial Structure Database 2008 (World Bank) 
Banking Activity Composite Index  Index that captures the extent to which banks are 
restricted from getting involved in securities and 
insurance underwriting, and real estate and commercial 
operations. Higher numbers mean larger restrictions. 
Banking Regulation & Supervision Survey 2005 (World 
Bank) 
Corporate Sector Vulnerabilities 
Total Debt to Assets Ratio (%)   Weighted average (across all firms in each country) total 
debt divided by total assets (2006) 
World Scope 
Short-term Debt to Total Assets 
Ratio (%) 
Weighted average (across all firms in each country) 
short-term debt divided by total assets (2006) 
World Scope 
Return on Assets (%)  Weighted average (across all firms in each country)  of 
net income (2006) to total assets(2006) 
World Scope 
Cash to Total Assets Ratio (%)  Weighted average (across all firms in each country) of 
cash divided by total assets (2006) 
World Scope 
Firms with Interest Coverage<1 (%)  % of firms with interest coverage ratio smaller than 1 
(2006), where interest coverage ratio is defined as 
earnings to interest rate expenses. 
World Scope 
Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities 
Budget Surplus or Deficit/GDP (%)  Government budget surplus or deficit (2006) to current 
GDP(2006) 
World Development Indicator 
Current Account Balance/GDP (%)  Current account balance (2006) divided by current GDP 
(2006), where current account balance is the sum of (i) 
exports minus imports, (ii) earnings on foreign 
investments minus payments made to foreign investors, 
and (iii) net transfers. 
Balance of Payments & International Investment Position 
Statistics (IMF)  and World Development Indicator 
Financial Account Balance/GDP(%)  Financial account balance (2006) divided by current 
GDP (2006), where financial account balance is capital 
inflows-outflows. 
Balance of Payments & International Investment Position 
Statistics (IMF) and World Development Indicator 
Total Reserves/GDP (%)  Total reserve assets (including gold, current US$) 
divided by current GDP (2006) 
Balance of Payments & International Investment Position 
Statistics (IMF) and World Development Indicator 
Mortgage Debt to GDP (%)  Mortgage debt extended by financial institutions divided 
by current GDP (2006) 
World Bank, IFC, BIS, EMF Hypostat, Market Watch, and 
World Development Indicator  
Mortgage Debt to GDP Growth Rate 
2003-2006(%) 
Percentage change in mortgage debt to current GDP 
ratio between 2003 and 2006.   
World Bank, IFC, BIS, EMF Hypostat, Market Watch, and 
World Development Indicator 
Avg. Annual Mortgage to GDP 
Growth Rate 2003-2006(%) 
The average of annual mortgage debt to current GDP 
growth rate between 2003 and 2006. 
World Bank, IFC, BIS, EMF Hypostat, Market Watch, and 
World Development Indicator 
Change in Real Estate Price 2003-
2006(%) 
Percentage change in real estate prices between 2003 
and 2006. 
BIS and Glindro (2008) 25 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Name  #Obs.  Mean  Median  Standard Deviation   Min.  Max. 
Local stock market returns in US$ (%)  86  -1.57  -1.36  8.85  -25.93  26.18 
Trade Channel             














(Export+Import)/ GDP (%)  76  73.79  68.45  34.66  21.8  187 
Fuel Exports/Total Exports (%) 













Financial Channel             
US Holdings of Foreign Equity/Local Market Capitalization (%)  74  8.52  6.95  8.15  0  33.96 
Foreign Holdings of US Equity/Local Market Capitalization (%)  72  5.18  1.62  7.78  0  39.11 
Chin-Ito Index of Financial Openness  80  0.70  0.88  0.31  0.16  1 
FDI Inflows/GDP (%)  77  6.02  3.88  6.31  0.07  29.29 
Portfolio Inflows/GDP (%)  76  3.60  2.17  4.19  0  19.84 
Other Inflows/GDP (%)  75  7.95  4.40  8.70  0.11  35.89 
Stock Market Turnover (%)  82  53.48  40.33  49.19  0.35  172.26 
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP (%)  79  71.27  49.79  59.92  2.50  285.57 
Banking Sector Vulnerabilities             
Capital Adequacy Ratio (%)  83  9.66  9.16  4.81  1.12  25.53 
Liquidity Ratio (%)  82  4.25  2.94  3.99  .27  16.26 
Private Credit to GDP Ratio (%)  76  71.39  62.48  46.87  11.36  183.84 
Banking Activity Composite Index  72  10.11  10  2.46  4  16 
Corporate Sector Vulnerabilities             
Total Debt to Assets Ratio (%)  61  25.47  25.56  8.64  2.22  45.68 
Short-term Debt to Assets Ratio (%)  61  10.58  9.09  6.26  0.43  24.79 
Return on Assets (%)  61  3.54  3.08  1.87  0.97  9.62 
Cash to Total Assets Ratio (%)  60  4.30  4.00  2.34  0.81  12.53 
Firms with Interest Coverage<1 (%)  61  18.72  18.89  11.00  0  47.51 
Macro and Sectoral Vulnerabilities             
Budget Surplus or Deficit/GDP (%)  72  -0.11  -0.29  3.99  -10.78  9.86 
Current Account Balance/GDP (%)  76  0.009  -0.48  9.63  -25.45  27.78 
Financial Account Balance/GDP (%)  74  2.16  2.38  9.87  -27.53  30.78 
Total Reserves/GDP (%)  76  18.30  15.78  14.53  0.38  72.62 
Mortgage Debt to GDP (%)  47  32.42  23.50  29.76  0.50  100.8 
Mortgage Debt to GDP Growth Rate 2003-2006(%)  39  121.95  29.99  207.41  -9.36  875.00 
Avg. Annual Mortgage to GDP Growth Rate 2003-2006(%)  50  20.73  7.62  30.55  -4.45  134.34 




Table 3: Testing the significance of the trade channel in the transmission of the 2007-2008 crisis 
Table shows results from regressing local market returns expressed in US dollars. Estimations include time dummies and country fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at the country level, are shown in parentheses.  *, **,*** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent significance level, respectively. 
Variables    Returns in US$     
US Stock Returns*Exports to US/GDP *Pre-Lehman  -0.074         
  (0.089)         
US Stock Returns*Exports to US/GDP *Post-Lehman  -0.166***         
  (0.057)         
US Stock Returns*Total Exports /GDP *Pre-Lehman    -0.157**       
    (0.068)       
US Stock Returns*Total Exports to US/GDP *Post-Lehman    0.0087       
    (0.0510)       
US Stock Returns*(Exports+ Imports)/GDP *Pre-Lehman      -0.119     
      (0.075)     
US Stock Returns*(Exports+ Imports)/GDP *Post-Lehman      0.011     
      (0.050)     
US Stock Returns*Fuel Exports /Exports *Pre-Lehman        0.095   
        (0.006)   
US Stock Returns*Fuel Exports/ Exports*Post-Lehman        0.040   
        (0.063)   
US Stock Returns*Agricultural Exports/Exports *Pre-Lehman          -0.064 
          (0.071) 
US Stock Returns*Agricultural Exports/Exports *Post-Lehman          0.031 
          (0.032) 
F-test null Pre-Lehman interaction=Post-Lehman interaction  2.08  6.90  4.26  1.26  0.10 
F-test (p-value)  0.154  0.010  0.042  0.264  0.747 
Observations  1561  1605  1581  1621  1558 
R-squared  0.526  0.515  0.516  0.538  0.533 
Number of countries  75  77  76  78  75 
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Table 4: Testing the significance of the financial channel in the transmission of the 2007-2008 crisis 
Table shows results from regressing local market returns expressed in US dollars. Estimations include time dummies and country fixed effects.  
Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, are shown in parentheses.  *, **,*** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent significance, respectively. 
Variables  Returns in US $ 
US Stock Returns*US Holdings of Foreign Equity*Pre-Lehman  0.278***           
  (0.071)           
US Stock Returns*US Holdings of Foreign Equity*Post-Lehman  0.215***           
  (0.041)           
US Stock Returns*Foreign Holdings of US Equity*Pre-Lehman    -0.019       
    (0.080)         
US Stock Returns*Foreign Holdings of US Equity*Post-Lehman    -0.051         
    (0.046         
US Stock Returns*Chinn-Ito Index of Financial Openness*Pre-Lehman      -0.037       
      (0.086)       
US Stock Returns*Chinn-Ito Index of Financial Openness*Post-Lehman      0.089*       
      (0.053)       
US Stock Returns*FDI Inflows/GDP*Pre-Lehman        -0.031     
        (0.089)     
US Stock Returns*FDI Inflows/GDP* Post-Lehman        -0.007     
        (0.041)     
US Stock Returns*Portfolio Inflows/GDP*Pre-Lehman          0.257***   
          (0.062)   
US Stock Returns*Portfolio Inflows/GDP*Post-Lehman          0.136***   
          (0.046)   
US Stock Returns*Other Inflows/GDP*Pre-Lehman            0.069 
            (0.079) 
US Stock Returns*Other Inflows/GDP*Post-Lehman            0.086* 
            (0.047) 
F-test null Pre-Lehman interaction=Post-Lehman interaction  0.89  0.35  3.26  0.09  4.08  0.05 
F-test(p-value)  0.349  0.556  0.075  0.763  0.047  0.823 
Observations  1539  1499  1667  1604  1587  1566 
R-squared  0.558  0.534  0.519  0.524  0.531  0.522 
Number of countries  74  72  80  77  76  75 
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Table 4: Testing the significance of the financial channel in the transmission of the 2007-2008 crisis (cont.) 
Table shows results from regressing local market returns expressed in US dollars. Estimations include time dummies and country fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the country level, are shown in parentheses.  *, **,*** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent significance, respectively. 
Variable  Returns in US$ 
        
US Stock Returns*Stock Market Turnover*Pre-Lehman  0.324***   
  (0.052)   
US Stock Returns*Stock Market Turnover*Post-Lehman  0.199***   
  (0.040)   
US Stock Returns*Stock Market Capitalization/GDP*Pre-Lehman    0.159* 
    (0.087) 
US Stock Returns*Stock Market Capitalization/GDP*Post-Lehman    0.077* 
    (0.046) 
F-test null Pre-Lehman interaction=Post-Lehman interaction  4.72  1.45 
F-test(p-value)  0.033  0.232 
Observations  1709  1644 
R-squared  0.544  0.525 
Number of countries  82  79 
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Table 5: Testing the significance of banking sector vulnerabilities in the transmission of the 2007-2008 crisis 
Table shows results from regressing local market returns expressed in US dollars. Estimations include time dummies and 
country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, are shown in parentheses.  *, **,*** denote 
significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent significance level, respectively. 
Variables  Returns in US $ 
 
US Stock Returns* Bank Capital Adequacy Ratio*Pre-Lehman  -0.171*       
  (0.089)       
US Stock Returns*Bank Capital Adequacy Ratio*Post-Lehman  -0.069       
  (0.054)       
US Stock Returns*Bank Liquidity Ratio*Pre-Lehman    -0.183***     
    (0.068)     
US Stock Returns*Bank Liquidity Ratio* Post-Lehman    -0.042     
    (0.046)     
US Stock Returns*Private Credit to GDP Ratio*Pre-Lehman      0.237***   
      (0.062)   
US Stock Returns*Private Credit to GDP Ratio*Post-Lehman      0.129**   
      (0.049)   
US Stock Returns*Banking Activities Index*Pre-Lehman        -0.161** 
        (0.067) 
US Stock Returns* Banking Activities Index*Post-Lehman        -0.146*** 
        (0.046) 
F-test null Pre-Lehman interaction=Post-Lehman interaction  1.55  5.35  3.56  0.04 
F-test(p-value)  0.217  0.023  0.063  0.850 
Observations  1730  1714  1587  1503 
R-squared  0.511  0.511  0.545  0.571 










Table 6: Testing the significance of corporate sector vulnerabilities in the transmission of the 2007-2008 crisis 
Table shows results from regressing local market returns expressed in US dollars. Estimations include time dummies and country fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, are shown in parentheses.  *, **,*** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
significance level, respectively. 
   
Variables  Returns in US$ 
 
             
US Stock Returns*Total Debt to Assets Ratio*Pre-Lehman  0.142*         
  (0.080)         
US Stock Returns*Total Debt to Assets Ratio*Post-Lehman  0.0412         
  (0.072)         
US Stock Returns*Firms with Interest Coverage<1*Pre-Lehman    0.184**       
    (0.074)       
US Stock Returns*Firms with Interest Coverage<1* Post-Lehman    0.0003       
    (0.062)       
US Stock Returns*Short-term Debt to Total Assets Ratio*Pre-Lehman       0.084     
      (0.082)     
US Stock Returns*Short-term Debt to Total Assets Ratio* Post-Lehman      0.060     
      (0.061)     
US Stock Returns*Return on Assets*Pre-Lehman        -0.091   
        (0.058)   
US Stock Returns*Return on Assets*Post-Lehman        0.079   
        (0.054)   
US Stock Returns*Cash to Total Assets Ratio*Pre-Lehman          -0.012 
          (0.093) 
US Stock Returns*Cash to Total Assets Ratio*Post-Lehman          0.063 
          (0.054) 
F-test null Pre-Lehman interaction=Post-Lehman interaction  3.19  9.56  0.11  9.09  0.96 
F-test(p-value)  0.079  0.003  0.745  0.004  0.332 
Observations  1287  1285  1284  1284  1265 
R-squared  0.573  0.576  0.569  0.576  0.573 








Table 7: Testing the significance of macroeconomic vulnerabilities in the transmission of the 2007-2008 crisis 
Table shows results from regressing local market returns expressed in US dollars. Estimations include time dummies and country fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, are shown in parentheses.  *, **,*** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
significance level, respectively. 
Variables  Returns in US$ 
         
US Stock Returns*Current Account Balance/GDP*Pre-Lehman  0.061       
  (0.074)       
US Stock Returns*Current Account Balance/GDP*Post-Lehman  -0.031       
  (0.048)       
US Stock Returns*Financial Account Balance/GDP*Pre-Lehman    -0.107     
    (0.073)     
US Stock Returns*Financial Account Balance/GDP*Post-Lehman    0.029     
    (0.054)     
US Stock Returns*Total Reserves/GDP*Pre-Lehman      -0.137   
      (0.098)   
US Stock Returns*Total Reserves/GDP*Post-Lehman      -0.075   
      (0.046)   
US Stock Returns*Budget Surplus or Deficit/GDP*Pre-Lehman        0.0002 
        (0.073) 
US Stock Returns*Budget Surplus or Deficit/GDP*Post-Lehman        0.024 
        (0.069) 
F-test null Pre-Lehman interaction=Post-Lehman interaction  1.44  3.02  0.85  0.10 
F-test(p-value)  0.235  0.087  0.492  0.754 
Observations  1581  1541  1581  1288 
R-squared  0.530  0.528  0.522  0.542 
Number of countries  76  74  76  62 
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Table 8: Testing the significance of sectoral vulnerabilities in the transmission of the 2007-2008 crisis 
Table shows results from regressing local market returns expressed in US dollars. Estimations include time dummies and country fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the country level, are shown in parentheses.  *, **,*** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent significance, respectively. 
 
Variables  Returns in US$ 
         
US Stock Return*Mortgage Debt to GDP *Pre-Lehman  0.090       
  (0.078)       
US Stock Return*Mortgage Debt to GDP *Post-Lehman  0.036       
  (0.049)       
US Stock Return*Mortgage Debt to GDP Growth Rate 2003-2006*Pre-Lehman    -0.089     
    (0.127)     
US Stock Return*Mortgage Debt to GDP Growth Rate 2003-2006*Post-Lehman    -0.037     
    (0.073)     
US Stock Return*Avg. Annual Mortgage to GDP Growth Rate 2003-2006*Pre-Lehman      -0.107   
      (0.100)   
US Stock Return*Avg. Annual Mortgage to GDP Growth Rate 2003-2006*Post-Lehman      -0.020   
      (0.067)   
US Stock Return*Change in Real Estate Price 2003-2006*Pre-Lehman        0.070 
        (0.059) 
US Stock Return*Change in Real Estate Price 2003-2006*Post-Lehman        0.075 
        (0.059) 
F-test null Pre-Lehman interaction=Post-Lehman interaction  0.60  0.21  0.72  0.00 
F-test(p-value)  0.442  0.653  0.402  0.956 
Observations  970  806  1034  693 
R-squared  0.598  0.647  0.614  0.719 









Table 9: Testing the significance of multiple factors in the transmission of the 2007-2008 crisis 
Table shows results from regressing local market returns expressed in US dollars. Estimations include time dummies and country fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at the country level, are shown in parentheses.  *, **,*** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent significance level, respectively. 
Variables  Returns in US dollars 
            
US Stock Returns*Portfolio Inflows/GDP*Pre-Lehman  0.115  0.096  0.135**  0.092 
  (0.079)  (0.069)  (0.064)  (0.061) 
US Stock Returns*Portfolio Inflows/GDP*Post-Lehman  0.039  0.039  0.042  0.007 
  (0.069)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.055) 
US Stock Returns*Stock Market Turnover*Pre-Lehman  0.257***  0.131  0.104  0.108 
  (0.065)  (0.081)  (0.085)  (0.082) 
US Stock Returns*Stock Market Turnover*Post-Lehman  0.188***  0.107  0.143*  0.209*** 
  (0.058)  (0.073)  (0.076)  (0.064) 
US Stock Returns*US Holdings of Foreign Equity/Local Market Capitalization*Pre-Lehman    0.177*  0.216**  0.075 
    (0.089)  (0.089)  (0.081) 
US Stock Returns*US Holdings of Foreign Equity/Local Market Capitalization*Post-Lehman    0.120**  0.097*  0.102* 
    (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.053) 
US Stock Returns*Private Credit to GDP Ratio*Pre-Lehman      -0.039  -0.083 
      (0.084)  (0.076) 
US Stock Returns*Private Credit to GDP Ratio*Post-Lehman      -0.041  -0.102* 
      (0.053)  (0.056) 
US Stock Returns*Firms with interest coverage<1*Pre-Lehman        0.166** 
        (0.069) 
US Stock Returns*Firms with interest coverage<1*Post-Lehman        -0.025 
        (0.053) 
         
         
F-test for null that all regressors are jointly zero  35.23  31.44  32.30  54.71 
F-test(p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Observations  1523  1437  1354  1010 
R-squared  0.556  0.568  0.586  0.665 




Figure 1: Stock market returns, July 2007 – April 2009 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Comovement with US stock market, July 2007-April 2009 
Figure shows the coefficient from regressing each market’s monthly returns against US monthly returns over the period July 2007-April 2009. 
 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Impact of portfolio inflows to GDP on the comovement between local and US stock market returns 



























































































































































Figure 4: Impact of stock market liquidity on the comovement between local and US stock market returns 


































































































































































Stock market turnover (%)38 
 
 
Figure 5: Impact of bank capital adequacy on the comovement between local and US stock market returns 



































































































































































Bank capital adequacy ratio (%)39 
 
Figure 6: Impact of corporate leverage (debt to assets) on the comovement between local and US stock market returns 















































































































































Corporate debt to assets ratio (%)40 
 
Figure 7: Impact of the share of firms with interest rate coverage <1 on the comovement between local and US stock market returns 














































































































































% of firms with interest coverage<1